Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Masthead Logo

Mitchell Hamline Open Access

Faculty Scholarship

2019

Searching the Legacy of the Reformation for
Lutheran Responses to Modern Family Law
Marie Failinger
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, marie.failinger@mitchellhamline.edu

Publication Information
4 Concordia Law Review 147 (2019)
Repository Citation
Failinger, Marie, "Searching the Legacy of the Reformation for Lutheran Responses to Modern Family Law" (2019). Faculty
Scholarship. 459.
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/459

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.

Footer Logo

Searching the Legacy of the Reformation for Lutheran Responses to
Modern Family Law
Abstract

This article builds upon historical work on changes in the law of marriage, divorce and the family after the
Reformation, and describes how modern Lutheran theology, formed during the Reformation, evaluates
modern trends in American family law. From the key Lutheran theological insight that God is creatively
ordering human activity as a partner with human beings, the Lutheran tradition approaches issues such as nofault divorce and same-sex marriage with both trust and challenge.
Keywords

Lutheran, Reformation, Catholicism, Family law, Marriage, Divorce
Disciplines

Family Law | Religion Law

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/459

SEARCHING THE LEGACY OF THE REFORMATION FOR LUTHERAN RESPONSES
TO MODERN FAMILY LAW

Marie A. Failinger*

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................1
I. THE CATHOLIC MODEL OF MARRIAGE.........................................................3
II. REFORMATION MODELS OF MARRIAGE ......................................................3
III. THE LUTHERAN SOCIAL ESTATE ...............................................................5
IV. MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS OF MARRIAGE LAW ...................................7
V. LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF FAMILY ..........................................16
VI. THE CREATOR GOD REMAKES THE FAMILY ............................................19
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................28

INTRODUCTION
The Lutheran tradition offers a distinct witness to American
lawmakers as they attempt to respond to changing social mores about
marriage, family structure, and divorce. Because Lutherans respect both the
state and the family as critical creative orderings of God, 1 Lutherans can
effectively engage the state about the ways in which family law can support
or damage family structures and support or retard human flourishing.

*Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, and former editor, The Journal of Law
and Religion. A version of this paper was delivered at the Association of Teaching
Theologians of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in Canada on August 1, 2016.
1
Lutherans describe this concept variously as the orders of creation, orders of preservation,
and Creator’s Ordainings (Edward Schroeder’s term). See Ed Schroeder, Homosexuality and
Reformation Theology, CROSSINGS, https://www.crossings.org/homosexuality-andreformation-theology/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2019).
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Building heavily on the Reformation history of John Witte, Jr., this Article
will briefly trace the trajectory of the law of the family, most particularly, the
law of marriage and divorce from the Reformation and consider its
application to modern concerns. 2
Recent American family law jurisprudence has produced a spectrum
of views about the nature of the legal family and standards that should govern
it. On one end of this spectrum, some scholars argue for a return to a family
law that reinforces the legal privileging of the nuclear family of husband,
wife, and children, citing natural law or the essential nature of the human
community of marriage as based on gender differentiation to explain why this
is the most effective family form. 3 On the other end of the spectrum, some
family law scholars argue that the mother-child or caretaker-dependent
relationship is the core relationship around which family law should be built,
while other relationships should be relegated to governance by religious or
cultural communities or managed by spousal contracts. 4
Many have also noted, some with dismay, contemporary trends in
western nations to uncouple marriage from our concept of the family, though
it is important to understand that this is not a novel moment in history or a
cultural innovation. Legal historian Mary Ann Glendon reminds us that while
family formation and marriage preceded modern legal institutions, “marriage,
2

See generally JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION
LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1st ed. 1997). Admittedly, this story is necessarily
oversimplified, because each state’s family law has its own idiosyncrasies, developed as
legislatures and courts have responded to stories of family conflict and injustice.
3
One of the most interesting examples of an argument for traditional marriage is made by
Lynn D. Wardle. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Boundaries of Belonging: Allegiance, Purpose,
and the Definition of Marriage, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 287, 287–88 (2011). In his article, he
argues that given the deep human need for belonging, and the necessity of boundaries to
confine human community to a form that meets that need, particularly the community of
marriage, the protection and privileging of traditional heterosexual marriage is necessary to
protect the valuing of humans’ opportunity to experience such belonging. Id. at 288–91.
4
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
134–38 (2004) (concluding that marriage should be abolished as a legal category and its
perquisites and privileges transferred to the caretaker-dependent relationship).
AND
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. . . in the sense of a highly individualized heterosexual relation, is said to be
barely visible in some of the simplest human societies, and in others it is
viewed as irrelevant to family formation.” 5
I. THE CATHOLIC MODEL OF MARRIAGE
Indeed, the western law of marriage and divorce has been constantly
changing from its first stirrings. Professor Witte has traced three major
historical moments in the Western Christian history of marriage law. 6 Witte
describes the first movement toward the Catholic model of marriage, which
came to flower in the mid-12th century. 7 The Catholic model stresses the
natural, contractual, and sacramental dimensions of marriage. As a “natural
association,” Catholic theologians explained, marriage was “created by God
to enable man and woman to ‘be fruitful and multiply’ and to raise children
in the service and love of God.” 8 In this dimension, marriage also served as
a remedy for lust and a channel for natural passions. In the second contractual
dimension of marriage, the marital parties created “a contractual unit, formed
by the mutual consent of the parties” who thereby agreed to “a lifelong
relation of love, service, and devotion to each other.” 9 Third, Catholics held
that marriage was a sacrament, symbolizing the “eternal union between
Christ and His church,” and bestowing “sanctifying grace to the couple, the
church, and the community.” 10
II. REFORMATION MODELS OF MARRIAGE
The 16th century, the Reformation era, provided the second important
movement in Christendom in the development of family law. Witte traces
5
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY
IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 5 (1989).
6
WITTE, supra note 2, at 3.
7

Id.
Id.
9
Id. at 3–4.
10
Id. at 4.
8

3

three streams of marriage law that the Reformation gave rise to, streams
which all rejected the sacramental understanding of marriage and the
preference for celibacy over marriage but developed distinctive theologies to
understand the nature of marriage and the way in which law should be shaped
as a result. 11 Calvinists understood marriage as a sacred covenant of the
couple’s consent, ordained by God to be a lifelong union; God was a party to
the agreement, and in some sense, so were the couple’s family, witnesses,
pastor, and magistrate. 12 Anglicans analogized marriage to a political
commonwealth, holding “that it served and symbolized the common good of
the couple, the children, the church, and the state all at once,” thus
metaphorically rationalizing the headship of the husband over the wife and
parents over children. 13 Lutherans developed their own “social model of
marriage,” on which this brief Article is focused. 14
Finally, Witte describes an Enlightenment model that developed
between the 18th and late 20th centuries, which was based on a “voluntary
bargain struck between two parties who wanted to come together into an
intimate association.” 15 This contractual approach imposed few social
constraints or implications on the parties other than those governing other

11

See generally id.
Id. at 7. In the covenantal model, the marriage ceremony was an agreement between the
spouses, God as a third-party witness, the couple’s parents as “God’s lieutenants for
children” and “two witnesses, as God’s priests to their peers.” Id. Both the minister, who
blessed and admonished the couple; and the magistrate, who registered and protected the
marriage, also were “parties” to this marriage. Id. Calvinist theory suggested that there were
two tracks of moral norms, one for persons of all faiths and none, to be enforced by the state;
and a “higher morality of aspiration demanded of believers in order to reflect their faith,” to
be taught by the church. Id. Witte argues that Calvinists took the Lutheran social model and
added a spiritual dimension to earthly marriage, one that permitted only innocent spouses to
dissolve the covenant. Id. at 7–8.
13
Id. at 9. Although Anglicans embraced the covenantal aspect of marriage, the essential
calling of the family was to foster love, service and security, and teach the entire
commonwealth essential Christian norms. Id. at 8–9.
14
Id. at 5–6.
15
Id. at 10.
12
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contractual endeavors, e.g., “respect for the life, liberty and property interests
of other parties, and compliance with general standards of health, safety and
welfare in the community.” 16
III. THE LUTHERAN SOCIAL ESTATE
The Lutheran “social estate” of marriage law, developed between
1523 and 1559 in Germany, 17 is familiar to American Lutherans. As one of
several of God’s creative orderings, and following two-kingdoms theology,
marriage is not a sacrament, though for Luther, the church has an important
role in blessing, instructing, and supporting the family. 18 Rather, the law of
the family, including marriage and divorce, is a matter for state officials to
construct to serve social values and human dignity for Christians and nonChristians alike. 19
Witte notes that this Lutheran social model had a significant impact
on the law of marriage and divorce. 20 In terms of entrance into marriage, the
Reformers eliminated many sacramentally-based restrictions imposed by the
Catholic Church. Catholic prohibitions against priests and nuns marrying
others, and remarriage after divorce, are well known. However, at the time of
the Reformation, Catholic doctrine also restricted many other marriages
because of its sacramental nature. It prohibited marriages between a
godparent and godchild, blood relatives to the fourth degree, Christians and
non-Christians, persons related loosely by adoption, murderers and sexual
criminals, and marriages of those who did public penance for mortal sins, all
constraints that the Reformation narrowed or abandoned. 21 Reformers
continued to prohibit bigamy and polygamy, and permitted annulments
16

Id.
Id. at 55.
18
Id. at 51, 53.
19
Id. at 5–6.
20
Id. at 64–65.
21
Id.
17

5

because of physical impediments such as impotence or the lack of real
consent by one party in cases of coercion, fraud, or even a mistake about one
spouse’s virginity. 22
The Reformers also loosened sacramentally based Catholic
restrictions on divorce. Reformers saw divorce, as instituted by Moses and
Christ, as “a result of sin and a remedy against greater sin” and understood
that over time, God had revealed new proper grounds for divorce. 23 Because
the Protestants believed that the law of marriage and divorce was not divinely
pronounced but humanly constructed according to the best human reason,
post-Reformation family laws reflected widely disparate views about
appropriate grounds for divorce. A few Reformers favored legal divorce only
for adultery, while others permitted it for additional grounds; among them
willful desertion, refusal to have sex, impotence, incompatibility, threats of
death, deception, one spouse’s felonies, defamation of or conspiracies against
spouses, and even “frequenting of ‘public games’ or places of ill repute.” 24
Though Luther found himself among the more conservative in these
discussions, even he acknowledged that

marital brokenness

and

irreconcilable separation could be grounds for divorce, once noting that:
Certain queer, stubborn, and obstinate people, who have no
capacity for toleration and are not suited for married life at all,
should be permitted to get a divorce. Since people are as evil
as they are, any other way of governing is impossible.
Frequently, something must be tolerated, even though it is not
a good thing to do, to prevent something even worse from
happening. 25
While the Reformers did not shy away from acknowledging pedagogical

22

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 68.
24
Id. at 68–69.
25
Id. at 67 (quoting JAROSLAV PELIKAN AND HELMUT T. LEHMAN, trans., 21 LUTHER’S
WORKS 94 (1955–86)).
23
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functions of marriage, 26 Reformation marriage law focused on the role of
marriage as a public institution, like the Church and the state. Consistent with
that vision, Lutherans laid uncommon stress on the public nature of marriage
formation. They particularly pressed the importance of young people seeking
their parents’ help in finding a spouse and their approval of a marriage, the
desirability of having witnesses to attest to the marriage, and the need to
memorialize the marriage before the entire community through a public
registry. 27 As a public institution governed by secular public norms, marriage
law imposed community responsibilities for the welfare of the couple and the
family and, conversely, family responsibilities for the community. One of
those responsibilities of married couples and their families, which society
often does not think about as an aspect of modern marriage, was the family’s
calling to “take in and care for wayfarers, widows, and destitute persons” who
were formerly cared for by the Church. 28
IV. MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS OF MARRIAGE LAW
While Witte, Glendon, and others have traced the dynamism of family
law over these medieval and early modern centuries, the transformation of
family law has not stopped in our time, even though modern American law
still bears distinct traces of these Reformation changes. First, in the U.S. and
modern western societies, marriage is considered a social institution

26

For the Reformers, marriage served the theological function of revealing his sins to the
sinner, including lust. WITTE, supra note 2, at 5. They also taught “the virtues of love, patient
cooperation and altruism” to marital partners, and “Christian values, morals and mores” to
children and others. Id. at 5, 49, 52.
27
To be sure, Catholic tradition had been moving in this more public direction, albeit slowly.
Prof. Glendon notes that the Church’s position until the 16th century was that the consent of
the parties alone constituted a valid marriage. Though priestly blessings on marriage were
recorded as early as the second century, the custom of exchanging marriage vows before the
church door only arose during the Middle Ages, then later a public ceremony was prescribed
but not enforced. Finally, with the Council of Trent (1653), the Church required the marriage
ceremony to before a priest for the marriage to be valid. GLENDON, supra note 5, at 25.
28
WITTE, supra note 2, at 49.

7

governed by the state for practical social ends. Given that marriage plays a
vital role in organizing and sustaining social life, core Reformation legal
impediments to marriage remain much the same. The law of most American
states still voids, or makes voidable, bigamy and polygamy, incestuous
marriages, or those among couples within a prescribed degree of
consanguinity, marriages of young children, and marriages contracted by
those without the capacity to consent or through fraud or duress. 29 Some
states still require tests for diseases like syphilis or AIDS, though they are not
usually absolute bars to marriage or grounds for annulment as they were in
Reformation days, but rather used to inform marriage partners of what
diseases the couple may carry. 30
Second, 20th and 21st century marriage laws have largely adopted the
practices that reinforce the view that marriage is a social institution, requiring
parents to consent to the marriage of older minors, solemnization of the
marriage by a state-approved clergyperson or public official, official
witnesses to the marriage, and public permission and affirmation of a
marriage through requirements of a marriage license and registration. 31 The
American law of divorce has also recognized the public character of

29
Most American states have a range of ages at which marriage is absolutely prohibited,
permitted with the approval of a parent, and permitted without anyone’s consent (which is
normally age 18). See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL, FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS
(5th ed., 2010). States also employ a range of family relationships which prohibit the parties
from marrying. For example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, promulgated by the
American Law Institute, prohibits ancestor-descendant, sibling, and uncle or aunt and
niece/nephew marriages (except where tribal custom permits). J. THOMAS OLDHAM, FAMILY
LAW: UNIFORM LAWS AFFECTING THE FAMILY 540 (2012). Bigamous and polygamous
marriages are also prohibited in the Uniform Act. Id.
30
DOUGLAS J. ABRAMS, ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 167 (3d ed. 2012); see also
ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 122 (noting that most states require a physical examination which
may be for venereal disease, tuberculosis, rubella, sickle cell anemia, and mental
incompetence, and most recently, some states required AIDS testing). In some states, the
results of some of these tests can be bars to marriage but not all.
31
Model Marriage and Divorce Act, OLDHAM, supra note 29, at 540–42 (describing
formalities of marriage license, marriage certificate, solemnization and registration).

8

marriage. 32 Until the 1960s, divorce was limited to those who could prove
certain grounds to the satisfaction of judges required to issue formal orders
of divorce as they do today. 33 Originally, statutory grounds included adultery,
desertion, and sometimes physical cruelty. In the early 20th century, many
states expanded that list to include grounds such as mental cruelty, drug
addiction, or alcoholism. 34
Until recent decades, there were also families in the shadows of the
law; families not formed by a legal marriage of a man and woman. They
included children out of wedlock and their parents; men and women who
lived together without marrying; and gay and lesbian couples whose
relationship could not be admitted socially, much less receive legal protection
from the state. Indeed, an infinite variety of family forms—grandparents
raising their grandchildren, adult children living with their parents, unmarried
sisters and brothers living together, and single parents who moved their
families in together to save money—were not legally recognized or protected
as families. Gradually, the law developed or used existing legal forms to
provide some protection for these non-marital families. For example, nonparental relatives taking in children or disabled adults could obtain legal
guardianships and gay and lesbian couples could use powers of attorney or
wills to create rights similar to those that spouses have. However, these workarounds were often complicated, time-consuming, and expensive to put in
place.
Except for a handful of American states that have held on to common

32

WITTE, supra note 2, at 211.
Id.
34
See id. at 209 (noting that the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act eliminated impediments
such as inebriation, sterility, frigidity and incapacity, while making marriage voidable if
parties could not contract due to alcohol or drugs, disability, or duress or fraud); ELLLMAN,
supra note 29, at 259 (noting state-by-state variation in fault-based grounds from adultery
and desertion to physical and mental cruelty).
33

9

law marriage since its heyday in the late 19th century, adults in these nonmarital families were, for the most part, unbeholden to each other legally, no
matter how many years they had functioned as a de facto family. Until the
last few decades, even explicit agreements made by unmarried couples to
support each other or share assets were often unenforceable because these
relationships were considered “meretricious,” i.e., linking money to sexual
intercourse. 35 In rare cases, the courts would step in if one partner had taken
financial advantage of the other through provably fraudulent promises of
property or support that induced the other person to give up (usually) her life
prospects to provide care or services for that partner. 36 Otherwise, those who
lived as if they were families without marriage, loving and caring for others
in their household, but generally had no legal protection if the party with
income or assets chose to abandon them or died without a will naming their
partner as beneficiary.
For most of the 20th century, states had mechanisms for protecting
non-marital children, but they were tedious, clumsy, and often disrespectful
to families. Just an example, the paternity cases I handled as a Legal Aid
lawyer in the late 1970s and early 1980s required a mother to file a lawsuit
against the father of the child. Then she had to prove by credible testimony
or a relatively unsophisticated blood test that the defendant was the child’s
father. 37 If the blood test was not conclusive, as it often was not, women
would have to undergo a barrage of demeaning cross-examination questions
from the father’s attorney designed to show that the mother was sleeping
around and could have become pregnant by any number of men.

35

See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 411 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing Sullivan v.
Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372 (Mass. 1989)).
36
Id. at 413.
37
The HLA test, the predecessor to today’s DNA testing, was expensive, and thus, not widely
available. See generally How DNA Testing Has Changed, DNA DIAGNOSTICS CENTER (Sep.
2019), https://dnacenter.com/blog/dna-testing-changed/.
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Women who needed to receive welfare for their children could not
avoid this punishing experience because the federal government gave them
no choice. Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits were
conditioned on the mother’s cooperation in establishing paternity and support
so the state could ensure that child support was flowing to reimburse the state
for welfare benefits. Only if the mother could prove some serious harm to
herself or her child was she exempt from this duty of cooperation, even if she
did not think it would be in her child’s or her best interest to maintain contact,
since visitation rights almost always accompanied a paternity determination.
Even worse, actual child support orders were measly, resting on outdated
notions of the cost of supporting a child. Even when court support orders
were entered on behalf of children, non-marital fathers found any number of
ways to evade paying them, some even quitting their jobs to spite their former
lovers or moving to another state out of the reach of the law.
True to its ever-evolving nature, over the past 30 or 40 years, family
law in the United States has been undergoing even more transformation.
When I was a Legal Services attorney, American family law had just settled
into no-fault divorce as the norm, which itself was considered a sea-change
for marriage. No-fault divorce became popular in part because one party to a
marriage could exit without having to prove the other guilty of serious
wrongdoing, such as adultery or physical cruelty, a process that made
divorces difficult and encouraged courts to create artifices to permit warring
couples to divorce. 38 No-fault divorce also put an end to collusive divorces
in which both spouses who wanted out of the marriage would jointly
manufacture evidence giving rise to grounds for divorce. As an example, in
New York, women could be “hired out” to be the supposed “other woman”
38

See generally ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 425 (noting that no-fault divorce was swiftly
adopted in the decade after 1969 because fault-based divorce had become known, because
of its “prying, perjury and collusion, as corrupt and inhumane”).
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in a fraudulent adultery. A few staged racy photos later, the colluding
husband and wife could receive permission from the state to end their
marriage. 39 With the advent of no-fault divorce, feminists and others rejoiced
that they could leave marriages where their husbands were emotionally and
physically abusive, spendthrifts, or neglected their families, but not quite
enough to justify the limited fault grounds provided by the state. The
combination of no-fault divorce and constitutionally protected access to
contraceptives and abortion after Roe v. Wade gave American women more
choices about both their financial circumstances and their personal happiness.
A second major consequence of no-fault divorce, however, was not
so liberating. With no-fault divorce came the trend in many states of
abolishing permanent alimony which supported stay-at-home wives and
mothers, as well as those who worked for pay in part-time or low-paying
jobs. 40 In theory, now that women were believed to be autonomous and on
equal footing with men, many no-fault advocates argued that it was better to
wind up all economic relationships between husbands and wives by splitting
property assets once and for all at the time of divorce; other than child support
which continued until the children of the marriage reached 18. 41 For women
in marriages with large assets who had aggressive divorce lawyers, this may
not have resulted in dramatic harm. For an average middle- or working-class

39

See ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 260–62 (citing Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce
and the New York Anomaly, 36 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1121–33 (1936)); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 434–38 (2002). Ellman notes that
if the parties’ collusion was discovered, they would be denied a divorce. ELLMAN, supra note
29, at 260–61.
40
ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 552–54 (citing Katharine K. Baker, Homogeneous Rules for
Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There is No Standard
Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2012)). Family law historians also note that permanent
alimony substituted for dower, as well as accounting for fault in destroying the marriage,
since only innocent spouses were entitled to it. Id. at 545 (citing Mary Kay Kisthardt, ReThinking Alimony: the AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or
Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 61, 62, 65–73 (2008)).
41
See generally WITTE, supra note 2, at 212–13; ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 552.
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mother of this era, when such families had little by way of accumulated assets
except a house and car, and the husband brought home the paycheck, this
innovation was disastrous. Saddled with the children and often the debts of
the family, with few prospects for well-paying jobs, especially with child care
responsibilities, and often insufficient child support orders that fathers could
easily evade paying, single mothers struggled to survive.
Today’s American family law looks much different than it did with
these mid-20th century innovations, even though the nuclear family has held
on as the paradigm for legal regulation of the family. For marital families,
states have recognized that simply splitting up assets in a divorce by awarding
property to the person who had the means to purchase it and to take title in
his name, or even splitting accumulated property 50-50 with minimal child
support payments, often results in a windfall to the husband who has most of
the family wealth and earning opportunities. Lawmakers have devised ever
more complex sets of criteria for splitting up the property of the marriage. As
just one example, even where permanent alimony has largely disappeared,
some states grant a period of rehabilitative alimony or maintenance to permit
an unemployed or underemployed wife to get education or training for a
decent-paying job. 42
For non-marital families, courts have been slowly recognizing claims
of partners against each other where there were promises of support or the
couple acted like partners. The case widely credited for changes in this area
is Marvin v. Marvin, in which actor Lee Marvin’s live-in girlfriend Michelle
sued him for what was later termed “palimony” based on his alleged promise
that Lee would share his assets with Michelle if she would perform the roles

42

For a discussion of the title and equitable division approaches to property division, and the
many factors the courts take into consideration in determining what division is equitable, see
ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 320–22, 336–42

13

of companion, homemaker, housekeeper, cook, and hostess. 43 Despite the
fact that some states followed Marvin to create remedies for breakups in nonmarital relationships, other states, like Minnesota, hold onto the rule that nonmarital partners must produce written contracts of support to hold their
partners liable for property or support upon dissolution of the relationship. 44
More dramatically, states have recognized the necessity of ensuring that
children receive proper support when their parents do not live together as a
couple sharing expenses and income. Many have simplified the process of
identifying paternity, allowing fathers to acknowledge paternity immediately
when a baby is born. 45 Virtually all states have established uniform child
support guidelines at more realistic levels; many of these schemes take into
consideration the incomes of both parties, not just the custodial parent.46
States and the federal government have devised a panoply of methods of
collecting support from deadbeat parents, including wage garnishments; tax
refund captures; refusal of passports to obligors with $2500 in delinquent
support; revocation of driver’s, hunting, and other licenses; and even the
threat of prison to compel compliance. 47
Finally, and most recently, with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, the right of gay and lesbian couples to marry has been
recognized. 48 Prior to Obergefell, some states reacted to the growing clamor
43

Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976); SINGER, supra note 35, at 411–12
(describing the cases that gave rise to these changes and theories that give rise to legal
responsibility to share assets or support).
44
MARTIN L. SWADEN & LINDA A. OLUP, 14 FAMILY LAW 12–13 (2008).
45
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302 (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws
2017); OLDHAM, supra note 29, at 604. The Act also presumes paternity if the child is born
shortly after divorce or the father has lived with the child for at least his first two years and
held the child out as his own. Id. at 603.
46
ELLLMAN, supra note 29, at 518–20 (noting, however, the wide disparities in support
obligations between states).
47
Id. at 580–89; see also Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support
Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 617, 650 (2012).
48
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
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for same-sex marriage by enacting civil union or domestic partnership
statutes that would grant many or all of the legal protections of marriage to
cohabiting couples who chose to sign legal registries indicating their intent
to enter these legal relationships. 49 After Obergefell, whether such statutes
will survive for couples who do not want to get married but who still want
some of the legal protections of marriage is still unclear.
Thus, Professor Glendon’s observation about the thin thread between
marriage and family applies even in the modern nuclear family. In one legal
relationship between the parent and child, the state is highly involved,
arranging financial support, custody, and support, with joint custody being
ordered more frequently. 50 The second legal relationship, the spouse-tospouse or adult-to-adult (non-marital) relationship, is only loosely tied to the
first. 51
In this second legal relationship, as Witte notes, the reigning ideology
posits that marriage is a contract of convenience between autonomous,
independent partners on equal footing. 52 The partners select marriage when
each of them concludes that his or her best interests, including needs for love
and belonging, will be satisfied by the contract and it is relatively easy to
dissolve if these needs continue not to be satisfied.
However, it would be a mistake to suppose that this modern ideology
about marriage actually governs the family in practice. The state still supplies
most of the legal default rules for marriage: prohibiting certain marriages;
49

ELLMAN, supra note 29, at 974–81.
ABRAMS, supra note 30, at 754–55 (citing a 2008 ABA study concluding that 22 states and
the District of Columbia favor joint custody).
51
For an interesting proposal for legal change, see Merle H. Weiner, Regulating the
Relationship Between Parents: Moving Beyond Marriage and Custody Law, in THE
CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 1561–62 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018)
(arguing that the state should create a new legal relationship between non-married parents
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imposing legal duties of support on spouses during marriage through the
“necessities” doctrine; and supplying most of the rules for divorce on matters
such as child custody, visitation, child and spousal support, as well as spousal
division of property. 53 While more states are permitting couples to bargain
over these aspects through agreements before, during, and even at the end of
marriage, the law still imposes a heavy hand on agreements that are
considered coercive, extremely unequal, or otherwise against public policy. 54
Just as an example, few, if any, states will permit a parent to bargain his way
out of child support with the other parent’s agreement or a spouse to bargain
his way out of supporting his indigent spouse.

55

So, society lives with some

kind of amalgam of the Reformation paradigm and what John Witte calls the
modern or contractarian paradigm.
V. LUTHERAN THEOLOGICAL VIEWS OF FAMILY
The assumptions of this modern ideology of family law, however,
confound most of the lessons of Lutheran theology about the nature and role
of the family. First among them is an understanding of the structural role of
God’s creative orderings of marriage and family in the preservation of the
world. Much of the current family law ideology is premised on the
assumption that families are sui generis creations of the individuals who
53
See Jill Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 825, 835–39 (2004)
(describing some of the ways in which marriage continues to be a “status” relationship
governed by law rather than a contractual undertaking, including the refusal of states to
enforce a contract for domestic services, or a contractual waiver of a spouse’s duties to
provide “necessities” for his or her spouse).
54
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make them up, artifacts of human creativity much like a painting or a car
design. While there is a case to be made that the nature and ethos of families
is in part constituted by the creative work of those in each family, for
Lutherans, the family itself, or more broadly the household of Luther’s
time, 56 has a more structural role to play in the social fabric.
Central to any understanding of the family’s calling is the very real
vulnerability of the human child, whose rearing in the fear and love of God,
Luther thought, was the chief purpose of marriage. 57 Children are not only
physically vulnerable to the threats that parents worry about such as being
hurt by a car to being kidnapped and killed by a stranger. Especially in
modern, mobile capitalist societies where a person is a member of many
communities simultaneously and throughout their lifetime, children are
economically vulnerable (how do they meet their basic needs when they can’t
get a job until they’re 16?) and socially vulnerable (how will the communities
in which they grow receive them?). Moreover, the Reformers, like us,
recognized that children were educationally vulnerable: they needed the skills
necessary to make their way in the world, and they needed the moral
education that would allow them to fulfill their vocations to others in this
secular age. 58
In the modern age, children are also religiously vulnerable, sometimes
in very dramatic ways. Even in the mid-20th century, when I grew up in a
household in which each of us pursued our individual interests and our family
moved from state to state, our constants were table prayers and bedtime
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For an argument for returning to the use of the Reformation concept of household as the
concept for providing most government benefits currently provided to nuclear families, see
generally Marie A. Failinger, A Peace Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage Wars: Restoring
the Household to its Proper Place, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195 (2004).
57
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SOCIAL ETHICS OF THE REFORMATION 154 (Literary Licensing 2011) (1960).
58
Id. at 152–56.
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prayers, Lutheran day school, Sunday worship, Sunday school, vacation
Bible school, and the examples of parents and other adults to mold us as
Christians. Today, most modern American children can count on only a few
of these supports for their growth into religious maturity. The one-parent
family, and even the two-parent family, is a structure too overloaded to
support children as they travel through the challenges of childhood and
adolescence.
It is easy to make a parallel, if not identical, argument about the
vulnerability of adults in families, both marital and non-marital. To be sure,
a family consisting of an intimate childless couple, or two brothers living
together, has a history of experience that is different from a family in which
parents are taking care of their children. Yet, the basic needs of human beings,
from the need for human love and touch to the need for partnership in the
tasks of survival, are universal. Most, though not all, human beings reach for
communities of human intimacy, whether emotional or physical or spiritual,
at some time in their lives. 59
Given that these different relationships create human vulnerabilities
within each family, I would argue that Lutheran theology breaks with those
who are arguing for a return to a more pristine version of the nuclear family
as the paradigmatic, or only, family to be recognized for legal protection. As
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noted, the traditional Protestant approach to marriage would object to
valorizing the family as an ultimate spiritual good or a sacrament. Even so, it
is very easy for Protestants advocating for a return to tradition to come close
to suggesting that the nuclear family is the DNA of human existence, without
which it is impossible to imagine meaningful human community.
VI. THE CREATOR GOD REMAKES THE FAMILY
It is easy to understand this nostalgia for the nuclear family, since
forming marriages and having children is one of the most recurring and
consistent experiences of human communities, existing across cultures and
history. But in valorizing the nuclear family as the ideal family, Lutherans
see the potential seeds for idolatry. For Luther, marriage was not to be
idolized as an oasis against the real world. It was an imperfect remedy (a
“hospital for the sick,” he called it) for some of the real-world harms that
result in conditions of sin. 60 Like all things co-created by God and humans,
marriage and the family are social institutions that bring great joy and
goodness; but they are all thoroughly infected with sin, incapable of
perfection, and the site of continuing human tragedy. Failing to understand
and acknowledge that there is no ideal family compared to which all other
family forms are broken is a first step for Lutherans toward forgetting where
not just their salvation, but also their flourishing really lies: in humans’
relationship with the Triune God. The family (real or ideal) is a false god,
whether real or imagined, and a god that will betray its members every time.
Second, valorizing the nuclear family (or any family form, including
the mother-child dyad) as the central and unchangeable form of human
community gives the lie to the very essence of God as a continual Creator.
While Lutherans understand all too keenly that God absconds from human
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attempts at such a definition, they can and must affirm that God is directly
involved in always changing the family as an order of creation in God’s
continuing work to shape the creation so that human beings can flourish in
their present circumstances. There is no reason to think that while Lutherans
affirm the changes wrought by the creating hand of God all around our world,
from our ever-taller and more colorful human race to the creation (and
extinction) of new species, the family has been exempted from that
continuously creating power.
Indeed, history and sociology tell us that the makeup of the family
varies widely in diverse times and places, from the large household model of
biologically related members, students, friends, and guests, to temporary
households of two persons. 61 So, as Lutherans reaffirm that the family is not
our own personal creation but given by God’s hand, they must also reaffirm
the power and prerogative of God to change the created order, or orders, of
the family to those that permit human beings to flourish and to be blessed.
From another angle of vision, Lutherans understand that membership
in the family is one of their callings from God to serve their neighbor.
Neighbor is not the opposite of family, a threatening outsider compared with
the family imagined as an association in which we are safe, and to whom we
owe our ultimate loyalty. In the Lutheran perspective, the neighbor is a more
comprehensive term for the Other; and those in our family are a subset, albeit
a distinctive subset, of those who are our neighbors. Three salient points
worth repeating are contained in this Lutheran idea of callings in the family.
First, God is continuously calling human beings, whether they acknowledge
God or not, to their families. Families are not personal inventions. Second,
people’s roles in their own families are to serve each other, matching each
one’s distinctive gifts to the others’ distinctive needs, rather than using or
61
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misusing others toward one’s own desired ends. Third, God’s call to service
is precisely aimed toward creating concrete conditions for human flourishing
in this life, which will always, inevitably and tragically, be infected with
human limitation and sin.
It also bears re-emphasis that God does not just call each of us human
beings to our families, but that God calls each family, and each person in
them, to the world. Remember the Reformers’ expectation that families or
households were called and were given the strengths and means to take in the
widow, the wayfarer, and the destitute person. This was not an altruistic or
supererogatory expectation, it was just as much a calling as the calling to their
family members. The modern introspective view of the family, one that
suggests that adult members should be spending all their time and wealth on
children or spouses or turn their backs on others’ problems to take care of
those in our own families, has it exactly backwards. Taking in neighborhood
children for pizza or showing up to pack meals for the poor is as much “family
time,” in the Lutheran understanding, as the family vacation or the nightly
bedtime ritual.
What is the role of secular law, part of the political order of creation,
in this construction? Secular law employs the power of the state to prevent,
deter, and punish the evil that human sin causes, and to ameliorate it to the
extent possible. It does so through both restraining and affirmative acts of
government, which Lutheran doctrine has recognized from the beginning. 62
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Thus, secular law is an important opportunity for citizens in a
democratic society, and our legal representatives in government, to exercise
our roles as co-creators with God in constructing law that will enable each
family, no matter its composition, to flourish. First, we need to think
collectively about what family forms are capable of producing trustworthy
relationships of human flourishing shored up by a state that expects us to
accept our callings as members of families. Treating the creation of families
as simply a contractual matter between two adults who have children together
does not respect the conditions of sin in which selfishness and power
imbalances can distort the equity that healthy families require.
Certainly, citizens exercising their rational and moral faculties can
have diverse political views about the benefits and problems with various
forms of state intervention, whether they take the form of regulation and
management of, or financial subsidies to, the family. But whatever the
appropriate role of the state is, these legal protections and benefits need to be
extended to all forms of family that provide this nurturance. Thus, for
example, it makes sense that the state should recognize the duties of family
members to provide basic economic support to each other, regardless of
whether they are nuclear or not. Similarly, there is no reason, at least in
theory,

why

siblings,

grandparents,

and

grandchildren,

or

other

configurations of family cannot receive the hundreds of state benefits and
protections that married couple families currently receive: from Social
Security death benefits, welfare payments, and medical assistance, to rights
to visit family members in the hospital, or to receive property inheritances in
we have protection and peace, and without them we could not eat and
retain our daily bread.
Lutheran Confessions, The Lord’s Prayer, Fourth Petition, in THE BOOK OF CONCORD: THE
CONFESSIONS OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH 202 (Theodore G. Tappert et al.
eds., Fortress Press 1959) (1580).
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death. The extension of marriage to same-sex couples in the United States
has eliminated many of those problems for them, but not for the other kinds
of families. Those “nontraditional” families still need to spend money and
considerable time to even come close to replicating many of the legal
protections and benefits taken for granted by the marital nuclear family.
To be sure, it may not always be easy to delineate the difference
between a “real” family and a collection of people who temporarily live under
the same roof. However, American courts have some experience trying to
define these factors as some have attempted to extend some of the protections
of married couples to informal families. For example, in Braschi v. Stahl
Associates, the court was faced with deciding whether a gay life-partner
should be allowed to stay in his partner’s rent-controlled apartment, a
privilege granted only to family members under New York City law. 63 The
court listed a number of factors in making the decision that the surviving
partner was legally considered “family,” including the longevity of the
couple’s relationship, how exclusive it was, and whether the couple held
themselves out as a family to others and were treated as such by extended
family members. 64 The Court also looked at whether the partners
commingled their income and assets, held property together, jointly paid
debts of the household, gave each other power of attorney, were listed as
beneficiaries on life insurance, and so forth. 65 Similarly, states that have
recognized common law marriages over time have had to identify and apply
a number of factors to decide whether a couple that has not chosen to
solemnize their marriage should nevertheless be treated as a legal family.
Criteria for identifying which households are families and which are not
families may vary from state to state, but they are not impossible to formulate.
63
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Alternatively, as noted, many states and countries have in recent years
offered the opportunity for couples, or some others, to identify themselves as
family by registering as domestic partners to obtain at least some of the rights
and benefits automatically granted to married people. 66 This procedure
recognizes families in situations in which partners agree to responsibilities to
each other, but again, it does not go far enough; it does not resolve the rights
of non-marital partners where one refuses to record a partnership or enter a
marriage because he or she is too selfish to share his income and assets with
his partner or a member of his family.
Second, we need to think about whether current American family law
adequately holds even married persons accountable for sustaining
relationships of reliance and trust that they have built over time with spouses.
In the Lutheran view, our service to our neighbor is a demand by God that
we cannot ignore, and no less when that neighbor is a member of our family.
Three states, Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas, have attempted to recognize
these responsibilities by co-mingling traditional religious and modern secular
ideas about marriage in covenant marriage. 67 Couples must freely choose this
form of marriage, but do not need to do so. If they make this choice, they are
required to get premarital counseling before they can be legally wed and must
show that they obtained marital counseling before they divorce. Covenant
marriage waiting periods before divorces are final and generally longer than
for no-fault divorces, and a person divorcing in a covenant marriage must
show a listed “fault” as a basis for divorce, i.e., adultery, commission of a
felony, or physical or sexual abuse of either the spouse or children. Separation
over a lengthy period of time is another ground for divorce recognized in
covenant marriage jurisdictions. 68
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Whether covenant marriage is a salutary development in theory or
not, only a small number of couples have opted for covenant marriage and
there is no evidence that covenant marriage has slowed the rate of divorce in
states where it is an option. Those who argue against a return to fault-based
divorce note that there are downsides; not the least of which is the financial
and emotional trauma that families face in a contested fault divorce. They
point out that, while divorce rates rose when no-fault divorce was instituted,
“domestic violence rates fell by approximately 20-30 percent and wives’
suicide rates fell by 8-13 percent.” 69
Even without a return to fault-based divorce, the requirements in
some states that couples seek counseling intervention or attempt to mediate
their divorce if reconciliation is not possible may be a welcome development
if these requirements are managed effectively. 70 As an example, some states,
such as Minnesota, give a financial break on marriage licenses to those who
have obtained premarital counseling, as a way of incentivizing thoughtful
entrance into marriage instead of restricting or preventing it. 71
Just as importantly, for marriages that are indeed so broken that
members of the family are being irreparably harmed by their continuation,
secular law must ensure a just and adequate accounting on behalf of all
parties. To be sure, clarity in the delineation of rights and duties, both about
property and about things like custody, support, and visitation, is important
to avoid further incidents of high conflict. And it may be true that a married
couple’s emotional journey through divorce has to include some ritualized
sense of the ending of the marriage. However, the modern concept of family
law that the affairs of the family should, as much as possible, be wound up in
69
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the divorce decree belies the fact that most married or unmarried couples and
their children are always in relationships, albeit different relationships, after
divorce, so any “final decree” also needs to account for the past and the future
as well as the moment of divorce.
In recent years, many states have moved in the direction of providing
a more adequate accounting of the past of the couple in the division of assets
and family income. For example, in recognition of the differing contributions
of both husbands and wives to marriage, more states now use a strict 50-50
split, or equitable division rule, regardless of who earned the money for those
assets or holds legal title to them, and even regardless of who may have been
at fault in the divorce. 72 More states have attempted to make more equitable
property awards to spouses who have supported their husbands or wives
through school, only to have the supported spouse desert them right at the
time they would have reaped the rewards of the partnership. 73 Similarly, as
mentioned, many states have accounted for the difficulties faced by long-time
caregivers or disabled spouses by awarding larger property settlements,
rehabilitative alimony, or even in some cases permanent alimony where the
special needs of one spouse warrants it. 74
Even so, these awards often fall short of a just solution, whether they
look backwards to acknowledge the contributions that each spouse made to
the marriage, or forward to the ongoing needs of each member of the family
and the relative ability of both spouses to earn a decent living and meet their
children’s expenses. As just one example, there has been significant litigation
over whether an objecting wealthy non-custodial father should be legally
forced to pay for college for his children over 18, or whether the custodial
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parent is essentially stuck with the responsibility of making sure her children
get a college education. 75
Lutheran theology would argue that justice and the needs of both
spouses and children are more important considerations than autonomy in
dividing family assets. Again, Lutherans would argue that it is not a
supererogatory act of a saint when a parent goes beyond meeting his
children’s or ex-spouse’s minimal needs. Rather, it is an expectation of that
person’s calling to one who has relied on him and who is vulnerable, and such
an expectation can thus be legally imposed.
Perhaps the most critical issue that Lutherans face in the area of
modern family law is to reconsider whether the law should spell out any
relationship between sexuality, marriage, and family in an era in which social
mores and the availability of contraception have uncoupled the relationship
between sexuality, marriage, and children. One of the reasons the law has
begun to respond to the needs of non-marital partners and their families is
that there are so many more of them now. A 2014 Pew Center study found
that the share of unmarried American adults is at a historic high, one in five
adults ages 25 and older (and 23% of men), compared to half that percentage
in 1960. 76 A quarter of these unmarried adults 25-34 live with a partner, and
almost half of all married people cohabit before they get married. 77 In 2014,
40% of births were to unmarried mothers, a slight decline from the 41% share
from 2008-2013. 78 For the most part, criminal law has abandoned enforcing
any expectations about sexuality and reproduction, with the exception of
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children or disabled adults who are protected because they are not deemed
capable of consent. As suggested, civil law too has moved in the direction of
treating individuals who make sexual or reproductive choices outside of
marriage more like marital partners in terms of rights and responsibilities,
though at a slow pace. Given their theological presuppositions, Lutherans
face a number of challenges as they consider whether society can accept, as
an adaptation of God’s creative ordering, a social structure in which sexuality
and procreation are uncoupled from marriage. Lutherans, like many other
Christians, continue to grapple with the question that still lingers after
Obergefell, whether marriage is by its nature defined by biological
complementarity, or whether God is doing a new thing in creating marriages
not defined as heterosexual in essence. They must ask whether they can
affirm a mother-child dyad, in which a father or second parent is either
literally or essentially absent, as a socially and legally equivalent form of
family that can provide the same security, pedagogy, and human community
as families with two parents. They must ask whether, from the perspective of
the state charged with protecting children, there is any essential legal
difference between biological parents, or those adults now recognized by
some courts to be psychological, or de facto, parents of the children they have
raised, particularly in cases where psychological parents are fighting
biological parents for custody.
CONCLUSION
All of these questions about families and family law push hard on
Lutherans to confirm their original witness that God is creatively ordering
human lives on this earth as a partner with human beings in human
institutions. The Lutheran tradition calls for Christians to trust and challenge
human institutions, acknowledging that they are a place of God’s activity in
the world, just as much as churches. That tradition reminds Lutherans that
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Christians and non-Christians alike bear the mark of God’s goodness in their
ability to reason about the institutions that create trust and permit human
flourishing in the world, and that the institution of secular law is also infected
by human limitation and sin, no more or no less than God’s other creative
orderings, such as the Church and the family. That reality makes it possible
for Lutheran citizens to go forth in resolving these very difficult issues with
others from different religious traditions or none, from different
communities, and nations, because they have faith that they can trust God’s
blessing on their labors.
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